Expanding Commitment to Those Who Served

The opening of Golden Gate University School of Law’s Veterans Legal Advocacy Center (VLAC) this fall represents a major stride in the university’s commitment to serve military veterans by helping some with their legal issues and by supporting others who wish to join the legal profession — while also offering GGU Law students an opportunity to assist with veterans’ legal needs

Expanding Commitment to Those Who Served

The opening of Golden Gate University School of Law’s Veterans Legal Advocacy Center (VLAC) this fall represents a major stride in the university’s commitment to serve military veterans by helping some with their legal issues and by supporting others who wish to join the legal profession — while also offering GGU Law students an opportunity to assist with veterans’ legal needs

Decentralized Convergence to Nash Equilibria in Constrained Deterministic Mean Field Control

This paper considers decentralized control and optimization methodologies for large populations of systems, consisting of several agents with different individual behaviors, constraints and interests, and affected by the aggregate behavior of the overall population. For such large-scale systems, the theory of aggregative and mean field games has been established and successfully applied in various scientific disciplines. While the existing literature addresses the case of unconstrained agents, we formulate deterministic mean field control problems in the presence of heterogeneous convex constraints for the individual agents, for instance arising from agents with linear dynamics subject to convex state and control constraints. We propose several model-free feedback iterations to compute in a decentralized fashion a mean field Nash equilibrium in the limit of infinite population size. We apply our methods to the constrained linear quadratic deterministic mean field control problem and to the constrained mean field charging control problem for large populations of plug-in electric vehicles.Comment: IEEE Trans. on Automatic Control (cond. accepted

Centrality measures for graphons: Accounting for uncertainty in networks

As relational datasets modeled as graphs keep increasing in size and their data-acquisition is permeated by uncertainty, graph-based analysis techniques can become computationally and conceptually challenging. In particular, node centrality measures rely on the assumption that the graph is perfectly known -- a premise not necessarily fulfilled for large, uncertain networks. Accordingly, centrality measures may fail to faithfully extract the importance of nodes in the presence of uncertainty. To mitigate these problems, we suggest a statistical approach based on graphon theory: we introduce formal definitions of centrality measures for graphons and establish their connections to classical graph centrality measures. A key advantage of this approach is that centrality measures defined at the modeling level of graphons are inherently robust to stochastic variations of specific graph realizations. Using the theory of linear integral operators, we define degree, eigenvector, Katz and PageRank centrality functions for graphons and establish concentration inequalities demonstrating that graphon centrality functions arise naturally as limits of their counterparts defined on sequences of graphs of increasing size. The same concentration inequalities also provide high-probability bounds between the graphon centrality functions and the centrality measures on any sampled graph, thereby establishing a measure of uncertainty of the measured centrality score. The same concentration inequalities also provide high-probability bounds between the graphon centrality functions and the centrality measures on any sampled graph, thereby establishing a measure of uncertainty of the measured centrality score.Comment: Authors ordered alphabetically, all authors contributed equally. 21 pages, 7 figure

Nash and Wardrop equilibria in aggregative games with coupling constraints

We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of Nash and Wardrop equilibrium. By exploiting a characterization of the two equilibria as solutions of variational inequalities, we bound their distance with a decreasing function of the population size. As second contribution, we propose two decentralized algorithms that converge to such equilibria and are capable of coping with constraints coupling the strategies of different agents. Finally, we study the applications of charging of electric vehicles and of route choice on a road network.Comment: IEEE Trans. on Automatic Control (Accepted without changes). The first three authors contributed equall

Gradient Dynamics in Linear Quadratic Network Games with Time-Varying Connectivity and Population Fluctuation

In this paper, we consider a learning problem among non-cooperative agents interacting in a time-varying system. Specifically, we focus on repeated linear quadratic network games, in which the network of interactions changes with time and agents may not be present at each iteration. To get tractability, we assume that at each iteration, the network of interactions is sampled from an underlying random network model and agents participate at random with a given probability. Under these assumptions, we consider a gradient-based learning algorithm and establish almost sure convergence of the agents' strategies to the Nash equilibrium of the game played over the expected network. Additionally, we prove, in the large population regime, that the learned strategy is an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium for each stage game with high probability. We validate our results over an online market application.Comment: 8 pages, 2 figures, Extended version of the original paper to appear in the proceedings of the 2023 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC